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Abstract
A number of macroeconomic models of open economies under
flexible exchange rate assume a strong version of perfect capital
mobility which implies that currency speculation commands no risk
premium. If this assumption is dropped a number of important results
no longer obtain. First, the exchange rate and interest rate cannot be
in steady state unless both the government deficit and current account
equal zero, not simply their sum, as would otherwise be the case.
Second, even in steady state the domestic interest rate can deviate
from the foreign interest rate by an amount whichdepends upon relative
domestic asset supplies. Finally, introducing risk aversion on thepart
of speculators can reduce the response on impact of the exchange rate
to changes in domestic asset supplies. In this sense rational speculators,
if they are less risk averse than other agents, can destabi'izeexchange
markets.
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(203) 436—8414 (217) 333—2354The advent of floating rates among the major currencies has
led to the development of increasingly sophisticated models ofopen
economies in which exchange rates are market determined. As waspointed
out in the early work of Fleming (1962) and Nundell (1963) thedegree of
international capital mobility is crucial in determining theresponse of
an economy to both monetary and fiscal actions. And while the Fleming—
Mundell analysis is based on the traditional static short—run model, the
importance of the degree of capital mobility applies to the long—run
response as well.
Perhaps because capital does seem to be very mobile among the
major industrial countries, the polar assumption of perfect capital
mobility has received most attention. This assumption may be inter-
preted in two different ways, however. The first, weaker version is
that bonds that are free of default risk domestically are also free of
default risk abroad; in Aliber's (1973) terminology, there is no 'political'
risk. When capital mobility of this degree obtains, foreign bondson which
forward cover has been obtained are perfect substitutes for domestic bonds
and arbitrage brings the domestic interest rate CR) into equa.1.ity with
the foreign interest rate (R*) plus the forward premium on foreignexchange
(F). Thus covered interest parity (CIP) obtains
RR*+F (1)
where R, R* and F are defined over the same time interval. In fact,
empirical evidence suggests that among the major industrial nations,
deviations from CIP are not significant; see, e.g., Aliber (1973),
Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977).—2—
A stronger definition of capital mobility is one that adds to
the criterion for the first the requirement that attitudes toward exchange
risk be characterized by risk neutrality, either because there exists a
sufficient number of risk neutral speculators, or because exchange risk
is perfectly diversifiable. In this case, speculation will bring the
forward premium on foreign exchange into equality with the expected rate
of appreciation of the foreign currency; that is,
F (/E)e (2)
where E denotes the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency, and where for any variable X, we define kdX/dtand
denotes the expectaticn of X. Substituting (2) into (1) yields the
condition
K =R*+ (/E)e (3)
a condition which is referred to as w2coveredinterestparity (UIP) and
which requires both (1) and (2) to hold.1
However, the empirical evidence in support of (2) is not as
strong as it is for (1). Levich (1978), Bilson (1978) and Hansen and
Hodrick (1980) report some systematic deviations for several exchange
rates over long periods. These findings are consistent with financial
models of foreign investment which suggest that risk aversion among
rational, fully informed speculators will create a risk premium, thereby
causing (2) to break down. Solnik (1973), Kouri (1976), Adler and
Dumas(1977),Frankel (1979) andEatonand Turnovsky (1981) derive various
expressions for this premium based on expected utility maximization.—3—
But despite the lack of theoretical justification for UIP and
the empirical evidence against it, most well—known results aboutthe
behaviour of macroeconomic models with perfectly mobilecapital require
this stronger definition to apply. Thispaper develops a model of a
small open economy under the more general assumption that the forward
premium on foreign exchange is determined by risk averse speculative
behavior. Capital is still perfectly mobile in the weakersense that
CIP obtains and a special case of our model is one in which thedegree
of risk aversion tends to zero, in which case UIP appliesas well. We
use this model to examine several propositions about the behaviour ofa
small open economy with a flexible exchange rate. These pertainto: the
effects of changes in domestic asset supplies and foreign interestrate
on the steady—state levels of the domestic interest rate and exchange
rate; the effects of ongoing government deficits; and the dynamic
behavicurof the exchange rate between steady states. Ourpurpose in
this analysis is twofold. First, we wish to illustrate theimplications,
some of them rather implausible, of assumptions that have been prominent
in the literature. Secondly, we wish to examine the behaviourof the
exchange rate under a more general specification that is consistent
with a more plausible set of outcomes.
In Section I which follows we develop a dynamic model of an
open economy in which the exchange rate, interest, rate, and forward
premium are determined at each instant by money market and forward
market equilibrium conditions, together with CIP. Atany moment, the
price of nontraded goods and asset supplies are predetermined, while we
treat the foreign interest rate and price level as exogenous. Over time,—4—
the price of nontraded goods adjusts gradually to the price of traded
goods; the supplies of domestic assets change through the government
deficit, while the balance of payments on current account determines
the change in foreign asset supplies. With risk averse speculative
behaviour, exchange rate and price dynamics, on the one hand, become
inherently linked with asset supply dynamics on the other. For the
system as a whole, and the exchange rate and interest rate in particular,
to be in steady state, all asset accumulation must cease and for this
to occur, both the budget deficit and the balance of payments on current
account must equal zero.
In the limiting case in which speculators are risk neutral,
the conditions for the exchange rate and price level to attain steady
state may be relaxed. For example, with a bond—financed government
deficit, it is necessary only for the budget deficit and current account
surplus to awn to zero. Thus the exchange rate and price level can be
in steady state even if the government deficit is perpetually unbalanced,
as long as it is offset by an appropriate imbalance on the current account.
Thus when UIP obtains a small country can run a perpetual current account
deficit without affecting its exchange rate or its interest rate.2 If,
in addition to UIP, asset supplies do not affect the demand for money,
the exchange rate and the price level evolve independently of the govern-
ment deficit and the balance of payments on current account outside of
steady state. In this case, the exchange rate and price level can be
in steady state even if these two quantities do not sum to zero.3
These observations are of relevance to a number of recent
studies of exchange rate dynamics (e.g., Dornbusch (1976), Gray and—5—
Turnovsky (1979), and Wilson (1979)) who specify models of exchange
rate and price dynamics in which domestic and foreign bondsupplies
"play no explicit role. This exclusion islegitimate only under the
strong assumption of UIP (an assumption all these authors make).
Furthermore, Mundell's (1963) finding that under flexible rates a
government deficit will not disturb the steady state exchange rate or
interest rate (because its effect on the total bond supply is offset by
the current account) also requires UIP to hold.
In Section II we examine the properties of the steady state
itself. An important aspect of the income determination models of
Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) and of the exchange ratedynamics of
Dornbusch (1976) et al. is that, in steady state, the domestic interest
rate equals the foreign interest rate and is independent of domesticasset
supplies.4 In addition, the steady stateexchange rate and domestic
price level are homogeneous of degree one in the domesticmoney upp1y.
None of these results are preserved when speculators are riskaverse.
Thus, even if CIP obtains, the domestic interest rate can be affectedby
domestic policies in steady state, something that is not possible under
UIP. Also, the exchange rate and domestic price level are homogeneous of
degree one, and the interest rate homogeneous of degree zero, in the
supplies of both domestic assets taken together, and not just money.5
Sections III and IV examine the transition between steady
states, a subject which has been receiving extensive treatment recently.
In Section III we show that once—and—for—all proportional unannounced
increases in the supplies of money and domestic bonds introduced simul-
taneously can, on impact, cause either a smaller than, or greater than,—6—
proportional response in the exchange rate. This result contrasts with
the previous models in which, under similar assumptions but with UIP
'S
holding,the exchange rate necessarily 'overshoots' its steady state
6 value.The change in the exchange rate on impact can vary inversely
with the degree of risk aversion. Our model thus suggests a sense in
which speculation (or more properly, less risk averse speculation)
destabilizes exchange rates; this is in the sense of increasing their
short—run sensitivity to changes in domestic asset supplies. FinaLLy,
in Section IV we consider the dynamic effects of once—and—for—all
unannounced changes in the money supply, achieved via open market
operations.
I. A Dynamic Macro Model
We consider a small open economy in which private agents may
hold as assets domestic money, domestic bonds, and foreign bonds, all
of which, we assume, they regard as components of their net wealth.
The first two assets are denominated in domestic currency, and the
third in foreign currency. Thus at any moment, private nominal wealth
Wisgivenby
W=M+Ad+EBd (4)
where N denotes the supply of domestic money (which we assume is held
only domestically), Ad the number of domestic bonds held domestically,
the number of foreign bonds held domestically, E is the spot rate
measured as the price of a unit of foreign exchange in terms, of
domestic currency.—7—
We assume that there is no perceived risk of defaulton
domestic or foreign bonds so that CIP obtains
R=R*+F . (5)
Since our analysis is in Continuous time, F measures the instantaneous





where E(t,t+h) is the price at time tofone unit of foreign exchange
in period t+h. Since as the time unith-+O,the spot and forward rates
must converge, E(t) =E(t,t),in which case the limit in (6) may be
expressed by the following partial derivative
F(t) =E(t,t)/E(t,t)
. (6').
Since domestic and covered foreign bonds are perfect substitutes
we shall assume that all domestic bonds are held domestically. Thus we
let Ad =A,where A denotes the total supply of domestic bonds. We allow
to assume negative values when domestic agents issue liabilities
denominated in foreign currency.
Individuals consume both traded and nontraded goods, which are
imperfect substitutes. Perfect goods arbitrage ensures that the prices
of traded goods are determined by the law of one price. We assume that
because of long term contracts, the prices of nontraded goods atany
instant are fixed at P, say. An index of the domestic cost of living
C is therefore—8—
C =P(EP*)1 0 << 1 (7)
where d denotes the share of nontradad goods in consumption and P* is
the exogenously given foreign price level (i.e., the foreign price of
traded goods). For notational simplicity we set P* 3..




where Y is real output and H W/C denotes real wealth. Note that we
have deflated by C, reflecting the fact that real wealth dependsupon
the price of both traded and nontraded goods in accordance with their
shares in consumption. Note that only R, the domestic interest rate
is included in the money demand function. Elsewhere (Eaton and Turnovsky
(1981)) we have derived optimal savings and portfolio behaviour for a
single consumer in a two period model in which money provides utility
viaitstransactions services. In this analysis, since domestic bonds
and money are assumed to be equally risky, the division of assets denominated
in domestic currency depends only upon the domestic interest rate.7
Together, equations (4), (5), (7) and (8) determine, at any
moment, equilibrium values of C, R, F, and W as functions of P, E, A, Bd,
M, and the exogenous foreign variables R* and
Wenow turn to the dynamic equations of the system. First, con-
sider forward market equilibrium. Participation in the forward market
may be for two reasons, speculation and arbitrate.8 We assume that the
real demand for speculative foreign exchange forward, denoted by J, is
an increasing function of the expected rate of return on speculation,—9—
given by the difference between the expected rate of depreciation of
the domestic currency (E/E)e and the forward premium F. Weshall assume
expectations are realized on average. Since we suppress stochastic
elements in our model, except for unanticipated once—and—for—allchanges
in asset supplies, this is equivalent toassuming perfect foresight.
Thus (IE)e =E/E exceptat the moment when asset supplies change.9
Forward market equilibrium requires that J equal thesupply of foreign
exchange forward for arbitrage; i.e., that which is sold to cover
domestic holdings of foreign bonds:
={_ F]
J' O . (9)
Such a specification follows from financial micro models of the forward
market; see, for example, Kouri (1976), Adler and Dunias (1977), and Eaton
and Turnovsky (1981). Frankel (1979) has emphasized that thisspecifica-
tion relies on the assumption that domestic government debt constitutes
a component of private national wealth, an assumption we make here. As
shown by previous authors, J embodies attitudes to risk taking. In
particular, J' varies inversely with the degree of risk aversion,
withJ' in the limiting case of risk neutrality; when CIP obtains.
By appropriate choice of units, the steady—state price of non—
traded goods can be equated to the domestic price of traded goods. We
assume that the price of noritraded goods is determined by long term
contracts, so that the nontraded goods price cannot jump instantaneously
to its equilibrium level, but can adjust only continuously over time,
as contracts expire. When the average price of non—traded goods exceeds—10—
its normal level, we assume that their output exceeds their steady state
supply and conversely. Consequently, we specify a relationship for the
supply of real output as
Y —Y=Z(E/p) Z' >0,z(1) = 0 (10)
where Y denotes the steady state value of Y, which we treat asexogenous.
We also assume that when Y >Ythe price of non—traded goods is revised
upwards and conversely. This adjustment is specified by the relationship'°
P =G(E/P) G' >0,G(l)=0. (11)
The rate of change in the supply of domestic assets is determined
by the government budget constraint
M+A=PG+EG_T+RAg (12)
where Gd and G represent real government expenditures on nontraded and
traded goods, respectively, and T denotes nominal tax revenues. The rate
of change in the domestic holdings of foreign assets is equal to the
balance of payments on current account
EBd =EX(•)—EG+ R*EBdb (13)
where X() denotes real net exports of the private sector.
Together with an assumption about how the government finances
its expenditures, equations (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13) determine the
evolution of E, P, Y, A, H, and Bd. From the description of the system
it might appear that the spot rate E is constrained always to move con-
tinuously. This is not so. Because of the assumption of perfect foresight—11-
embodied in (9), the dynamics will generally involve (atleast) one
unstable root. Following the rational expectationsmethodology, this
"rootmaybeeliminated by allowing the exchange rate to undergoan
endogenously determined initial jump at points where thesystem is
subject to an exogenous disturbance. Simple examples of this aregiven
in Sections III and IV below.
Define total nominal bond holdings B as
BA+EBd
Adding (12) and(13)and using the CIP condition (5), we obtain
M+B=pGd_T+EX+RB+(/E_F)EBd. (].4)
From this equation it is evident that in general the evolution of the
system depends upon the breakdown of B between domestic and foreign
bonds. Thus, for example, if 1 =0(the deficit is bond—financed), E,
P and B cannot assume their steady state values unless =A = 0;that
is, unless both the government deficit (g) and the balance ofpayments
on current account (b) are zero. Andthesame applies in the case of
money financing.
Consider, however, the limiting case in which J'(•) ,i.e.,
the speculative demand for foreign exchange forward becomesinfinitely
elastic. In order for the speculative demand to remain bounded, (2)




—T+ EX + RB. (14t)—12—
Writing(4) as
H =(M+ B)/C (4')
equations(4), (7), (3), (8), (10), (11), (14') constitute a dynamic
system in which A and Bd do not appear (assuming of course that A and
do not enter separately in the specifications of Gd, G, T, or X).
If the government deficit is bond—financed 1 =0.The dynamics depend
only upon the sum of the government deficit and the currant account
deficit (g + b) and not the separate components. Steady state now
only requires that B E P =0.The government may sustain a deficit
in steady state as long as it is offset by a current account deficit of
equal size, since the steady state requirement ñ0is equivalent to
A =_EBd.With money financing, both components must be zero.
A special case widely adopted in the literature, and therefore
of importance, arises if the demand for money is assumed to be independent
of real wealth H. Consider first the limiting assumption of risk neutral
speculation. If the government deficit is bond—financed, the dynamics
of P and E become independsnt of g + b and these variables can attain
steady state equilibrium with wealth, in the form of bonds, being
accumulated indefinitely. With a money—financed deficit, steady state
for E and P requires only that the government deficit be zero; the
current account balance can be non—zero, with domestic residents con-
tinually accumulating (or decumulating) foreign bonds. In the general
case where 3' is finite, no variable can be in steady state unless
gb =0.However, under bond financing E and P can attain steady—13—
statewith only b =0,provided one imposes the additional restriction
that net exports be independent of H.12
In formulating dynamic macro models such as the one above,
it is often convenient to specify real savings behaviour (or asset
accumulation) directly. Thus, if one postulates
End +M +A=SC.) (15)
it follows from (4), (13), and (15) that the rate of net capital inflow
EBd can be derived as
EBd =CS(•)—(1+ A)
= cS(•)—
[PGd+EG] + T—BA. (16)
Bycomparing (13) and (16) it isclear that S(•), X(), and the govern-
ment financing decision caimot be specified independently.
These observations about the appropriate specification of
dynamic models under perfect capital mobility have important implications
for various models appearing in the literature. First, the model of
exchange rate dynamics introduced by Dornbusch (1976) and studied by
other authors ignores the balance of payments and savings behaviour iii
analyzingthe dynamics of the exchange rate. This is possible only because
they assume UIP and that there are no asset supply effects on money demand.
Under the less restrictive condition of CIP, however, the dynamic adjust-
ment of the exchange rate, on the one hand, and asset accumulation, on
the other, are jointly determined, even in the absence of wealth effects
in the demand for money.—14—
Second, a well known result of Mundell (1968) is that a govern-
ment deficit has no effect on the steady state of a small open economy
under conditions of perfect capital mobility and flexible exchange rates.
This is certainly true under the conditions of UIP when any change in
the deficit will be offset by a change in the current account deficit,
leaving the system unchanged. However, it is not generally true under
CIP, when indeed steady state requires the deficit to be zero.
II. Steady State Properties
Models of exchange rate determination based on the assumption
of UIP and the absence of an ongoing inflation yield the following
steady state relationship
R=R* (17)
whereis used to denote the steady state value of a variable. Thus
-the domestic interest rate is completely tied to the world rate, from
which we immediately infer:
(i) Changes in the foreign interest rate yield
equal changes in the domestic interest
rate;
(ii) the domestic interest rate is independent
of the supply of domestic money or domestic
bonds.
Other steady state properties depend upon the policy specif 1—
cation and the dynamic system so generated. If one adopts the frequently
postulated savings function13—15—
S =(i(Y,R*)—H,Y) (18)
where H is some long—run desired level of real wealth, the steadystate
monetary equilibrium relationship becomes
=L(Y,R*,H(Y,R*)). (19)
From this equation, two further propositions follow:
(iii) A given change in the domestic money supply
leads to a proportionate change in the
exchange rate;
(iv) the exchange rate is independent of the
supply of domestic bonds.
None of properties (i)—(iv) characterizes the steady state of the model
presented in Section I, except in the limiting case when the speculative
demand for foreign exchange forward is perfectly elastic.14
We adopt the savings function (18) and assume, for simplicity
and withoutessentialloss of generality, that H is exogenous and inde-
pendent of the interest rate. The steady state of the model presented
in Section I is attained when E =P=A=M 0. Imposing these









\Given H, these five equations involve the seven variables, H, A,d
R., F, T. We shall assume initially that the monetary authoritiespeg H =N
and A =A,continuously adjusting T to balance the budget.
Thus M, A, along with R*, may be treated as exogenousparameters.
Totally differentiating the system with respect to these variables we
obtain the following effects on the domestic interest rate R
dR A —=——-< 0 (21a)
dN EL






Thus a once—and—for-all increase in the domestic money supply reduces
the steady—state domestic interest rate, while an increase in the
domestic supply of bonds increases it. An increase in the foreign
interest rate leads to a reduction in the forward premium, causing the
domestic interest rate to rise by a smaller amount. In the limiting
case when J' -, theresponse becomes proportional and in this extreme
case changes in M and A have no effect on R. Thus, unless speculators
are risk neutral or perceive no exchange risk, the domestic interest
rate is not totally determined by the interest rate abroad and responds
to domestic asset supplies in the manner indicated.V —17—
ultiplying (21a) by M and (21b) by A and sununing yields an
expression equal to zero. Thus an increase in the domesticmoney
supply accompanied by a proportional increase in the domestic bond
upply i.sneutralin ts effect on the steady state domestic interest
rate,
changes in1 and A have the following proportional effects




both elasticities are positive and less than one, ihIle summing to unity.
Thus,contraryto propositions (ill) and (Iv), an increase in the money
pply leads to a less than proportional increase in the exchange rate,
w4lethesupply of domestic bonds also affects the exchange rate.
rprtionalincreasesithesupplies of thetwonominal assets together
o proportional iflcreases in theexchangerate and the domestic
rcelevelsAs3' ,(22a)tends tounityand (22b)tendsto zero.
Thusonly in thisljmi. ting case do prOpOstjfls(iii) and(iv) hold.
isalplicyInvolves changing A.A well—knownpropositton
fiundeU (1963) and Fleming(1962) is thatunderflexible rates and
pectcapital mobilityfiscal po1cyhasno effect on the steady
t4teof a smallopen economy. Itisevident from our analysis that again
forthisresult o apply, perfect capital mobility must be interpreted
omeanthat UIP obtains, i.e., that foreign ecchange speculation requires
risk premium.—18—
Thesame general characteristics of the steady state described
by (20a)—(20e) obtain under alternative policy specifications. If, for
example, tax receipts are held at a constant real level, say r, and the
government finances its deficit with bonds, the steady state relations
(20a)—(20e) will continue to determine the steady state values of
R, F, E, and A. Now, however, (20e) requires the stock of domestic
bonds to adjust in proportion to the exchange rate, since T =Er.
Under UI? propositions (i) and (iv) still obtain but if UIP does not
hold these propositions will be violated as before. The responses of R
and E to changes in R* and M can be calculated (A is now eridogenous) and
willgenerally differ from the expressions given in(21), (22) above
becauseofthe difference in policy specification.
We conclude this discussion with a further comment on (21c),
which asserts that an increase in R* leads to a fall in the forward
premium, thereby leading to a smaller rise in the domestic interest
rate.This result turns out to depend upon the specification of the
savings function and under an alternative specification thedomestic
interestrate may actually increaseby more. Toillustrate this,
supposethat instead of specifying a savings function as we have done,
we specify a net export function
X —X(E/P,Y),3XI(E/P)>0,xIaY.0
The steadystate of the system now consists of (20a)—(20e), together
with the steady state of (13)
X(l,Y) —G+R*Bd 0 . (20f)—19—
Sincein steady state E =1',and Y =Y,Xis now fixed. H is now endogenous
and, given A and M, is determined together with B',E, R, F, and T.
Consider an increase in R*. Since insteady state X —Gis
independentof R* it follows from (20f) that in order forthe balance
of payments on current account to remain inequilibrium, Bd mustfall.
If d falls, forward market equilibrium condition(20d) requires the
forward premium to rise, in which case the CIPcondition (20b) implies
a larger increase in the domestic interest rate than the risein the
foreign rate.
III. Exchange Rate Dynamics: Proportional Increasesin Money and
Domestic Bond Supplies
We now consider an economy in which steadystate is disturbed
by once—and—for—all, increases in the money supply and domesticbond
supply of equal proportion and examine the behaviour of theexchange
rate during its transition to the new steady state. Forconvenience,
we assume a log—linear version of the model developed in SectionI.
Other simplifications are introduced not only toexpedite the dynamic
analysis, but also to make our results as comparable as possiblewith
the existing literature.
Following, for example, Driskill (1980), we take the follow-
ing log—linear approximation to wealth
h 1a + 2(e+bd)+ (l-p1-i2)m-cw -c (.23)
whereisthe share of domestic bonds in domestic wealth and is
theshare of foreign bonds.15 We denote r ER—R,fF —
F0and
for all other variables let x Zn X —ZnX0, where for any variabled —20—
X0 denotesthe value of X in the initial steady state. Thus x is the
percentage deviation in X from its initial steady state value.
Assuming that the foreign interest rate remains unchanged
at R*, the interest rate parity condition (expressed in deviation form)
is
r=f (24)
while the price index now becomes
c 5p + (l—iS)e . (25)
A log linear approximation to the supply function (10) is
y (e—p) p 0 (26)
and a similar approximation to money market equilibrium is givenby
m —C = —a1r+ '2 + a3y >0 (27)
Imposing the assumption of perfect foresight (except at points
where asset supplies change), the log—linear approximation to the condi-
tionfor forward market equilibrium becomes
e+bd_c=y(_f) (28)
wherey is the elasticity of speculative demand for foreign exchange
forward with respect to the risk premium. y varies inversely with the
degree of risk aversion with y -asrisk neutrality is approached.16
The adjustment of prices is specified by17
—O(e
—p) 0 >0. (29)—21—
Since our analysis treats the nominal supplies ofmoney and
domestic bonds as fixed everywhere except at one instant,savings must
"take the formofaccumulating foreign bonds. Assuming that interest
rates do not affect desired wealth, we approximate the asset accumula-
tion function (16) by
b =
—cy1h+ c72y 2 0 0 . (30)
This expression can also be interpreted as a log linear approximation
to the currentaccount equation.
Equations(23) to (30) constitute a complete dynamic system.
Equations (23) through (27) determine at any moment values of h, c,r,
y and £ as functions of e, p. and b, whose dynamic behavicuris described
by equations (28) through (30).
For the special case in which2 =0(zero wealth effects in
the demand for money) p =0(fixed real output) and y -(currency
speculationrequires no risk premium) the model outlined inequations
(23)to (30) reduces in essence to the one examined by Dornbusch(1976),
Gray and Turnovsky (1979), and Wilson (1979). As wementioned in
SectionI, when y +, exchangerate dynamics are independent of Bd and
A. For this reason these earlier studies did not require any assumptions
about the bond—financed component of the government deficit or about sav-
ings behaviour.
Dornbusch et al. consider the effects of a once—and—for—all
change in the money supply on the path of the exchange rate and price
level. As we pointed out in Section II, in the special case they con-
sider, the steady state effect of such a change is a proportional change—22—
In the exchange rate and the price level, with the domestic interest
rate remaining unchanged. To maintain this long—run neutrality in our
more general model, the change in the money supply must be accompanied
by a proportional change in the supply of domestic bonds. This policy
is a once—and—for—all transfer of money and bonds and is considered in
this section.
Consider an initial steady state in which all variables in
equations (23) through (30) are zero (i.e., in X in X, etc.) and
assume that the supplies of money and domestic bonds are both increased
once—and—for—all by rn percent.18 In the new steady state,===
whileall other variables return to their initial (zero) levels.
Solving equations (23) through (27) for h, c, r, f, and y,
and substituting the resulting expressions into (28) through (30)
allows us to describe the equations as a third—order system of differential
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where= = m,we may writethenonhomogeneous system (31) in
homogeneous form
a1 a2a3 x1
=8 —o 0 (31')
C1 C2 C3
Thesolution to the equation is
e(t)=+
A1exp(X1t)+ A2 exp(X2t)+ A3 exp(X3t) (32a)
p(t)=rn+
B1exp(A1t)+ B2 exp(A2t)+B3 exp(X3t) (32b)
bd(t)=
C1exp(X1t)+ C2 exp(X2t) + C3exp(X3t) (32c)
here X1, A2, andA3












andwhere given the arbitrary constant A1,
A2,and A3,theremaining




The constant term in (33) can be shownfromthe definitions of a. and c
1
tobe unambiguously negative, implying that the product of the roots,
A1A2X3
>o. Thus (31) has either one or three positive eigenvalues.
Moreover, the coefficient of A in (33), which equals —(X1X2 + A2X3 +
X3X1)
is almost certainly positive, in which case some of the roots must be
negative, so that in fact there can be only one unstable root. A
sufficient, but by no means necessary, condition for this to be so is
< imposing an upper limit on the fraction of foreign bonds
held. We shall treat the case of a single unstable root, denoted by A3,
as the normal one and impose the requirement that. the system converge
to its steady state, i.e.,
urn e(t) =;urn p(.t) =p; urn bd(t) 0
Convergence then requires that the coefficients of the unstable root
equal zero.2° Thus A3 =0and via, (34), B3C3 =0.
In keeping with the literature on exchange rate dynamics, we
assume that, whilediscontinuousjumps in the exchange rate are possible,
the price of nontraded goods is constrained to move continuously. The
fact that the exchange rate is determined by virtually continuous trad-
ing in an auction market, while the prices of nontraded goods are determined
mainly by a large number of longer—term contracts, makes this assumption
plausible. This constraint implies the initial condition
p(o)0 ; or B1 + B2 =—rn (35)
Similarly, the requirement that foreign assets can be acquired only con-
tinuously over time requires that the asset disturbance cannot move bd
from its initial level on impact, so—25—
bd(o)=0;or C1 + C2 =0. (36)
Equations (35) and (36), together with the four equations contained in
(34) for 11,2, determine the six coefficients of the stable roots,
namely, B1, C, I =1,2.
Assuming stability, consider now the value of the exchange
rate immediately after the increase in the supplies of money and bonds
takes place at t =0.This value, denoted by e(o+), is given by
A1 ÷A2
+ i.Thusthe exchange rate overshoots or undershoots its new
steady state level, according as the values of A1 andA2, derived from
(34)—(36) yield A1 + A2 0.
For the general case, an explicit analytical expression for
e(o+) proves to be rather intractable, and because of the complicated
nature of the calculations, not particularly illuminating.21 However,
a good indication of the likely response of the exchange rate to propor—
..tional increases in domestic assets can be obtained by focusing on two
polar cases; one in which asset accumulation proceeds very slowly,
another in which assets adjust very rapidly.
III. Slow Asset Adjustment
The first case we consider is one where the savings adjustment
to the shock is very slow relative to the price level adjustment. We
consider the limiting case in which == 0.Portfolio adjustment
costs may provide one justification forexamining this limiting case in
our example. The reason is that the steady state level of bd is
unaffected by the shock we consider. If price adjustment is relatively
rapid, wealth holders may not find varying their holdings of bd during
the transition to be worthwhile.—26—
In considering this special case, then, we may set bd(t) =0
for all c.Definingx1 and x2 as before, we can write the system in the
homogeneous second order form
1=Eaia2lFll (37)
[x2J [0 -OJ[xj
wherea0, a1,and a2 are as defined above.
The solution to this equation is
e(t)=rn+ A1 exp (X1t) + A2 exp(A2t) (38a)
______ A2—a1 p(t) =m+ A1
a2
exp(X1t) +A2a2exp(X2t) (38b)










if andonlyif 2 <l/(1—2).If the country is a creditor, this condi-
tion willcertainly be met if thewealth elasticityofthe demand for
money does not exceed unity, a condition which seems reasonable to
impose. Thus (40)impliesthat the system (37) has one negative and
one positive root, which we shall identify as A1 <0,A2 >0,
respectively.22—27—
To complete the solution requires the determination of the
arbitrary constants A1, A2. Imposing the requirement that thesystem
converges to its steady state,
urn e(t) =; urn p(t) =
Forthis to be so the coefficient of the unstable rootA2 =0.The
other constant is obtained from the condition thatp start from its









Substituting the values for A1, A2 into (38a), (38b), recalling
that e =p=rn,yields the following solutions for the exchange rate and









Consider now the value of the exchange rate immediately after the
increase in the money andbondsupplies at t= 0.This value, denoted




Itcan be established from (39) •that the smaller root A1 satisfies
X1<a1—O<a1
sothat e(o±)e(=in)as a20 or, equivalently, as
y[(1—c2)ô—c3p1 —cc5 0 . (44)
The exchange rate overshoots or undershoots its new steady
state value as e(o+)rn and (44) provides a simple criterion for
determining which of these two cases occurs. In the limiting case of
the Dornbusch model, =0,p =0,and ''- , ensuringthat overshoot-
ing takes place. Dornbusch also considers the case in which income is
endogenous and shows how the income effect in the demand for money can
lead to undershooting. But even when income is fixed (p =0),however,
the presence of imperfectly elastic speculation can lead to undershoot-.
ing. Given that speculators are risk averse, undershooting is more
likely to occur when the wealth and interest elasticities of money
demand are large.23 Furthermore, differentiating e(o+) with respect
to y indicates that as long as c2 <1,de(o+)/dy >0;an increase in
the elasticity of speculation raises the impact effect on the exchange
rate of a change in nominal asset supplies.
The phenomenon of overshooting has been cited as a reason for
the observed volatility of exchange rates; changes in asset supplies
create movements in exchange rates that exaggerate the implications of
these changes for steady state. According to this interpretation,
specu1aton acts to destabilize the foreign exchange market. As risk
aversion on the part of speculators falls, making the supply of—29—
speculative funds more elastic, the exchange rate reacts more sharply
to changes in asset supplies.24
To understand this result observe that since the prices of
nontraded goods are sticky, changes in nominal asset suppliesconstitute,
on impact, changes in real asset supplies. The exchange rate and
interest rate must adjust to restore asset market equilibrium. An
increase in the nominal supplies of money and domestic bonds increase
both the supply of and demand for money, the second via a wealth effect.
Taking the likely case a2 <1,the net impact on the money market is to
create an excess supply. To maintain equilibrium in themoney market
during the adjustment period requires a lower domestic interest rate,
which in turn requires a lower forward premium on foreign exchange, f.
When speculation is perfectly elastic, f = e. In thiscase,
a lower domestic interest rate requires a continuous apprecizticn (e <0)
during the adjustment period. If the exchange rate is to appreciate to
its new, higher, steady state value it must initially depreciate to a
value abovethatis, the exchange rate must overshoot.
When speculation is less thanperfectlyelastic, (y <co),how-
ever, an exchange rate depreciation also impinges on forward market
equilibrium by revaluing domestic holdings of foreign bonds. This
revaluation creates an excess supply of foreign exchange forward which
acts to bid down the forward premium on foreign exchange f. If the drop
in f required to restore forward market equilibrium excees the drop
required to restore money market equilibrium, then a continuous depreciation
>0)is needed to maintain equilibrium in both markets. For this con-
tinuous depreciation to converge to the new steady state exchange rate,—30—
the depreciation on impact must be less than the steady state deprecia-
tion; that is, undershoocing of the exchange rate must occur.
111.2. Rapid Asset Adjustment
The second case we consider is one in which wealth adjusts very
fast relative to the price level. We consider the limiting case in which
= while 2 =0.Thus bd adjusts to keep wealth at its desired level.
In this limiting case we allow the private sector to adjust its stock
of foreign bonds discontinuously in response to a change in domestic asset
supplies by running a large current account deficit or surplus. We no
longer impose the initial condition bd(O) =0.For simplicity, we assume
that desired wealth is constant, so that h =0,throughout.
In considering this case we use equations (23) through (27) to
solve for bd, c, r, y, and f, setting h =0,as functions of e and p,
whose behaviourcontinues to be described by (28) and (29). Equation (30)
-no longer applies. The system may now be described by the following homogeneous
pair of differential equations
S
x., a1 a2x1 (45)
0 —o
where x1 and x2areagain as before and now
(l_2)(l—S) 3p+ (l—S)
(l1.12) I___________ ___________ — _______ _____ I — I ____ a + ;a
— ;a 1'2 2'2 0LT2 1
Thesystem can be solved exactly as before, with a and a replacing a1
and a2. Its solution can be written as
-




"where A and are the characteristic roots of (45). Since
a' +a' _21 0
(47) 1 2
'(1.12 CL1
thereis again one negative and one positiveroot, which we identify
as A1 <0and A2 >0,respectively. This result applies to the net
debtor as well as to the net creditorcase, since >0in both cases,
while 12 <1.
Again we can use the condition for convergence and the initial
condition (35a) to establish that
—a










Immediately following the increase in the supplies ofmoney and bonds,
the exchange rate is given by
ra1 e(o+) =Jl
-1 rn (50)
As before a —ispositive so that e(o+)e as a 0, i.e., as—32—
yj.i2(6—a3p)+ c&1(l—i.i2)S0. (51)
\Again, when p =0and y =, overshootingnecessarily occurs. When
wealthis maintained at a constant level, however, the result can be
reversed only by an income effect (p >0).In addition, differentiat-
ing (50) with respect to y yields an expression ambiguous in sign;
increasingly elastic speculation may raise or lower the impact effect
on the exchange rate of a change in nominal asset supplies. When 6 is
near one, so that nontraded goods are the major component of the price
index, then increasingly elastic speculation will, as before, increase
the degree of overshooting. The opposite occurs as 6 approaches zero.
The reason for the different result from before is that, when
the private sector can dishoard foreign bonds instantaneously, the
exchange rate depreciation caused by the increase in the domestic asset
supplies leads to a decrease in the real value of foreign bonds held by
the public. The change is given by
bd(o+)+6e(o+)= 'a'X'
(1—6) — m (52) 2Ll1 J
whichis always negative. Since the shockwr consider now leads to a
fall rather than to arise in the real holdings of foreign assets, the
forwardexchange premiun fis increased. Our previous reasoning is
reversed.
Since e(o+)>0,while (52) is negative, bd(o+) <0.Thus
theeffect of a proportional increase in domestic nominal assets is to
create an initial balance of payments deficit, which is then offset by
a surplus as the nominal foreign bond supply is restored to its initial—33—
level. The rate of change in foreign bond holdings, andhence the current
account, during the return to steady state is given by
=
2(ali)[2[alJ_+xj
whichisalwayspositive. Thus there will be a simultaneous exchange
rateappreciation (< 0)and balance of payments surplus if overshoot--
ingoccurs on impact and simultaneous depreciation (> 0)and surplus
inthe event of undershooting.
In considering the extreme situations in which wealthadjusts
infinitely slowly or infinitely fast to monetary shocks, we have shown
how the presence of risk averse speculation cancomplicate considerably
the exchange rate dynamics. In addition, our results forthese special
cases suggest some implications for intermediate situations in whichthe
portfolio response is positive but less than infinite.First, even if
real income is unaffected, an increase in thesupply of nominal assets
can lead to undershooting or overshooting. A reduction in speculators'
risk aversion makes an overshooting response morelikely, and as speculators
become more risk neutral, overshooting is guaranteed.Secondly, an increase
inthesupply of nominal assets will create initially a balance ofpay-
ments deficit. A balance of payments surplus willeventuallyemerge
that restores the nominal level of foreign assets to its initialposition.
IV.ExchangeRate Dynamics: Open Market Operation
In Section III we analyzed a change in nominal assetsupplies
that was neutral in the sense that generated proportionalchanges in
the steady state domestic price level and exchange rate withno change—34—
inthe steady state domestic interest rate. We now consider a once—and—
for—all increase in the domestic money supply of rn percent that is
achieved by a purchase of domestic bonds. The percentage change in
bond supplies required is given by
a m (53)
p1
Starting from initial levels of zero, the percentage changes
in the steady state exchange rate, price level, and forward premium are
-- — e=p= ,,m (54a) P 1 +
-f= .0 (54b) +
respectively, while domestic holdings of foreign bonds change by
(1—p2)ym b =., >0. (54c) P1 •
Asour analysis in Section II indicated, only when speculators are risk
neutral (y -) dothe exchange rate and price level change in propor-
tion to rn, and the interest rate remain unchanged. Otherwise, there is
a less than proportional increase in e and p, while f falls. Note that
as y rises, so does the steady state response of bd to the open market
expansion.
The transition to the new steady state can again be described
by the system (31), the only difference being that a and c are
replaced by a =-rn/c,
C= 0,respectively. The same boundary condi-
tions on p, e, and bd apply. As before, an analytic solution in the
general case proves to be intractable and instead we focus on a special
case.—35—
In the first case considered in Section III in whichasset
adjustment is infinitely slow (o, =2
=0),the new steady state is
"never reached. Hencewe consider only the other polar case of very
rapid asset adjustment (c = = 0).The analysis proceeds as in
Section 111.2. Equation (45) continues to describe the dynamics of
adjustment, with a" replacing a', and can be solved as before.
Our criterion for the overshooting of the exchange rate in
Section 111.2 continues to apply. An interesting questionemerges,
however, concerning the effect on impact of the operation on the domestic
holdings of foreign bonds, which is given by
l_â_1.12 bd(o+) = e(o+). (55)
This expression is ambiguous in sign. The open marketopera-
tion can, on impact, create a current account surplus or deficitdepend-
ing upon whether the share of traded goods in consumption exceeds or is
exceeded by the share of foreign bonds in wealth.
The expression may also be smaller or larger than b.Foreign
bond holdings may overshoot their new steady state level,requiring a
subsequent deficit. Conversely, they may undershoot, so that a surplus
will always be maintained. Which takes place is independent of whether
exchange rate overshooting occurs. Consequently, the variety of simultaneous
dynamic adjustments of e and bd is large.
We cart also consider an open market operation in the form of a
purchase of foreign bonds in exchange for domestic money. To increase the
money supply by inpercent,the authorities must purchase an amount—36—
—
b=e(o+)+ m (56)
of foreign bonds. In terms of logarithmic deviations from the initial
equilibrium, the new steady state values of e, p, f, and bd are
respectively




-d 1.L1Ym b = >0 (57c)
1121 +
Once again, only when speculators are risk neutral ('v' --) dothe
exchange rate and price level change in proportion to rn and the interest
rate remain unchanged. Comparing (57) with (54) note that when the open
market operation is performed with foreign rather than domestic bonds,
the effect on the exchange rate and price level is greater, while that
on the interest rate is reduced.
For the case in which asset adjustment is very rapid (a=
a20), the dynamic analysis of Section 111.2 again applies. In the
absence of income effects, overshooting of the exchange rate necessarily
occurs. Since e is greater, while a and Xj are as before, e(o+) is
increased. Because the monetary authority has purchased foreign bonds
from the public and the exchange rate depreciation on impact is greater,
so is the initial current account surplus induced by the operation.—37—
V. Conclusion
The assumption that speculative foreign exchange positions
require a risk premium has implications for a number of propositions
about open economies with flexible exchange rates. Inparticular,
propositions about the impotence of fiscal policy and the equality in
steady state between domestic and foreign interest rates based on the
assumption of perfect capital mobility require the strong version of
this assumption——uncovered interest rate parity——to hold.They do not
obtain if only the weaker assumption of covered interestrate parity
holds.
Furthermore, introducing risk aversion along with wealth effects
in the demand for money has implications for exchange ratedynamics. It
tends to reduce the presumption of overshooting of theexchange rate in
response to monetary disturbances, both the likelihood that it happens
at all and the amount by which it occurs if it does occur. To the
extent that the major sources of disturbances are changes in nominal
asset supplies, factors encouraging currency speculation, such as an
increase in the number of speculators, are likely to reduce the overall
risk aversion exhibited by the market and increase the volatility of
the exchange rates. In this sense speculators destabilize the market.Footnotes
1Other authors draw thedistinction between perfect capital mobility
between countries and perfect substitutability between domestic and
foreign bonds. The former term corresponds to the weaker definition
of CIP, while the latter describes the strong definition of IJIP:
see Frankel (1981). Elsewhere, (Eaton and Turnovsky (1981)),
we explore the implications of this distinction for the efficacy of
policy and the international transmission of disturbances.
2This result pointsto a deficiency with the assumption, at least
as a basis for analyzing behaviourin steady state. As the size àf
a country's debt grows, so does its incentive to depreciate its
currency (if debt is denominated in domestic currency) or to default.
Either will lead to departures from UIP or CIP. Credit rationing
could eliminate capital mobility at the margin altogether. An addi—
tional problem, of course, is that a small country running a perpetual
deficit will eventually develop a debt that looms large in international
capital markets, if its debt grows faster than the world economy. In
this case its debt will have an impact on world interest rates.
3Steady states possessingvarying degrees of stationarity are familiar
from the literature; see, e.g., Dornbusch (1976), Turnovsky (1977).
4Th1s proposition is ofcourse based on the presumption that the world
is not characterized by conditions of secular inflation, anassump—
-tion made throughout this analysis. Under secularly inflationary
conditions, the steady state relationship between the domestic and
foreign interest rates under UIP is R R* +e,where e is the secular
rate of inflation. It is clear that through e domestic policies are
able to influence the domestic nominal rate of interest even if UIP
obtains.
5.
This result has also been obtained by Harris and Purvis (1979).
6We stress that thisstatement refers to models based on similar assump-
tions to those we shall introduce. A good deal of attention has been
devoted to the literature establishing the robustness of the overshoot-
ing phenomenon and many models in which it does not occur now exist.
Dornbusch (1976) shows that introducing variable output can eliminate
overshooting. Turnovsky (1981) shows that introducing imperfect sub-
stitutability between bonds and wealth effects can also eliminate the
phenomenon in a model in which prices are assumed to be perfectly
flexible. His analysis does not distinguish between imperfect sub-
stitutability arising from exchange risk (leading to departures from
UIP) and from political risk (leadingto departures from CI?). Else-
where (Eaton and Turnovsky (1981)) we show that each has potentially
different implications for the response of the economy to a monetary
shock.7Note also thatwe include real output, rather than real income in
the money demand function. This allows us to ignore the effects of
change in real income from foreign bonds on money demand. In the
absence of any strong theoretical argument in fav.irof using real
income rather than real output as a proxy for transaction demand, and
in view of the simplicity that obtains when the latter is used,we
have adopted this specification. See Dornbusch and Fischer (1980)
for an alternative approach, although their analysis treats real
income as fixed.
8We find itanalytically convenient to separate forward market partici-
pation into pure speculation and pure arbitrage. We implicitly treat
the acquisition of an amount of uncovered foreign bonds as combining
a covered investment of x in foreign bonds and a speculativepurchase offoreign currency forward in amount x. In a portfolio model of
foreign investment we identify a third motive for participating in the
forward market as hedging against domestic inflation. Forward positions
for hedging purposes depend upon the relative variability of the
domestic and foreign price levels and do not respond to the variables
we are concerned with here. Thus we may treat the forward position due
to hedging as a constant absorbed in see Eaton and Turnovsky (1981).
9The notion ofa "risk premium" on forward exchange in a non—stochastic
model is somewhat awkward, although no more so than having different
rates of return on different securities as is commonplace in conven-
tional deterministic macroeconomics. Our main reason for doing this
is to preserve analytical tractability and also to enable us topre—
serve comparability with the existing literature, which is also
deterministic. One interpretation of our approach is that while
expectations are on average realized, nevertheless 'the returns are
subject to risk, the magnitude of which will affect the function J;
see Eaton and Turnovsky (1981).
10This form of priceadjustment rule is specified by
=w(Y—Y)
Equation (U) is then obtained by combining this equation with (10)
to yield
wZ(E/P) EG(E/P)
11To see this, observe that with bondfinancing the dynamics of E, P
involve only equations (7), (3), (8), (10) and (11). With a money—
financed deficit equation (12), with A0, must be considered aswell. The fact that bond accumulation may continue in steady state
in the absence of wealth effects in relevant demand functions is
familiar from the simple IS—LM model; see, e.g., Turnovsky (1977,
Chapter 4).
12Another policy worthnoting is the balanced budget. As long as H
enters the money demand function, steady state always requires
g =b=0;irrespective of the elasticity of the speculative demand
for forward exchange with respect to the risk premium. The same
applies if L is independent of H, as long as J' is finite. The limit-
ing case of infinitely elastic speculation, steady state requires
only that g =0.
'3This type of specification isused, for example, by Tobin and Buiter
(1976) for a closed economy.
14Even in thislimiting case, propositions (iii) and (iv) do not necessarily
hold under alternative, plausible specifications of asset supply and
asset accumulation behaviour. Consider the case in which taxes are
maintained at a constant level in real terms.If the government deficit
is band—financed and if the demand for money is independent of H
propositions (iii) and (iv) do still hold. However, if the deficit
is money—financed an increase in the stock of domestic bonds causes
a proportionate change in E, which through the deficit leads to an
eventual proportionate change in M. This contradicts proposition
(iv), while the causality of (iii) is reversed. With a balanced
budget the exchange rate is homogeneous of degree one in money and
domestic bonds.
15For the case in which thecountry we are considering is a net debtor
in terms of foreign currency denominated bonds, bd should be inter-
preted as the logarithm deviation of this country's debt from its
steady state level. The term will then be a negative number,
where —i.2 is the logarithm of the net foreign currency denominated
debt.
16When thecountry we are considering is a net debtor in foreign
currency denominated bonds, then b' should be interpreted as in
footnote 15. The right hand side of (28) should then be reversed
in sign.
speculation deviates slightly from that adopted by Dornbusch et al.,
in which prices are assumed to adjust in proportion to excess demand,
as a result of which the domestic interest rate appears in (29) as
well. We have chosen our specification not only for reasons of its
simplicity, but also because it follows directly from a model based
on long—term contracts.
181n interpreting this initialsteady state in which all variables equal
zero it should be recalled that all variables are measured in deviation form.19This statement applies whether thecountry is a net creditor or a
net debtor.
Oconvergencemay follow by appealing to transversality conditions from
appropriate optimizing models which, provided that the underlying
utility function satisfies suitable restrictions, ensure that price
movements remain bounded.
21Buiter and Miller (1981) alsodevelop a third—order system to model
exchange rate dynamics. They can obtain explicit solutions for only
numerical examples, however.
22Even when the country isa net debtor <0),a positive and negative
eigenvalue will obtain except for extremely high values ofc2 and
231f we considera net debtor, the role of speculation in determining
the impact response of the exchange rate is much more complicated.
Its analysis is left as an exercise for the interested reader.
the other hand, dfX1/dy >0as well; a reduction in the risk aver-
sion of speculators increases the speed with which the exchange rate
and domestic price level attain their new equilibrium values.References
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